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Recent Cases

Alternative Energy Supplier Forbidden By Law And
Contract From Being Electric Utility Company's
Competitor
by Sara E. Neff
To recover under antitrust laws
for monopolization and attempted
monopolization, a plaintiff must
prove both that it is a competitor of
a defendant and has suffered an
injury which the antitrust laws were
designed to protect. In Schuylkill
Energy Resources, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power& Light Co., 113 F.3d
405 (3d Cir. 1997), the Third Circuit
affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. The court
concluded that when the law and a
contract both state that the plaintiff
is forbidden from competing with
defendant, plaintiff is unable to
bring a viable antitrust claim.

Congress Tried to Reduce
United States Dependence
on Foreign Oil
In 1978, the United States
Congress passed the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act ("PURPA")
to facilitate the development of
alternative energy sources and
reduce the United States' dependence on oil, especially foreign oil.
16 U.S.C. § 824 (1997). PURPA
mandates that electric utility
companies purchase electric energy
produced by independent power
producers operating "qualifying
cogeneration facilities." To effectively implement PURPA, Congress
empowered the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission ("FERC")
to promulgate the rules and regulations which govern the terms of
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sales and purchases of electric
energy. Concurrently, independent
state administrative agencies such as
the Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission ("PUC") regulate the
facilities and validate the contractual
arrangements covered by PURPA.

Energy Supplier Claimed to
be Competitor of Electric
Company
Plaintiff, Schuylkill Energy
Resources, Inc. ("SER"), is a
"qualifying cogeneration facility"
under PURPA and the PUC regulations. SER is an independent power
producer that operates an anthracite
coal refuse-fired cogeneration plant
in Pennsylvania. Defendant,
Pennsylvania Power & Light
Company ("PP & L"), is an electric
utility company regulated by the
PUC which relies on nuclear power
and coal-burning power sources. PP
& L is a member of an unincorporated association, known as PJM, a
power pool comprised of eight
electric utility companies from five
eastern seaboard states. As members
of the PJM association, companies
routinely sell their excess electric
generation to the association which
in turn sells it to other companies
within the power pool or to other
power pools.
Both the FERC regulations and
the terms of PP & L's contract with
SER mandate that PP & L purchase
energy from SER. On October 17,
1986, PP & L and SER entered into
a twenty-year contract. This contract

explicitly states that "SER is
required to sell exclusively to PP &
L, and PP & L is required to
purchase SER's entire net power
output up to 79.5 megawatts at a
price per kilowatt hour which is
either fixed within the agreement or
calculated as a percentage of PP &
L's Energy-Only Avoided Cost."
According to the contract, PP & L is
not required to purchase SER's total
output of electric energy. In fact, PP
& L can decrease the amount of its
total electric energy purchase when
the reduction is necessary for "PP &
L to make repairs, changes, tests or
inspections, or for reasons of an
actual or potential System
Emergenc[ies]." However, PP & L
may not reduce its total electric
energy purchases for purely economic reasons.
The Third Circuit disputed the
validity of whether the contract
required SER to sell energy exclusively to PP & L. Instead the panel
opinion suggested that SER technically could have excess power
available for sale if it first ensured
the availability of 79.5 megawatts
for PP & L's use. However, the
Third Circuit was required, as was
the district court, to consider the PP
& L's motion to dismiss accepting
all of SER's allegations as being
true. Thus, when SER's amended
complaint alleged an "exclusivity
provision," it became the controlling
fact under review.
In its amended complaint, SER
alleged that PP & L improperly
construed the term "system emer-
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gency" in an effort to reduce its
purchase of electric output produced
by SER. According to SER, PP & L
decreases its purchases of energy
from independent power producers
with high energy prices when the
aggregate demand for power within
the service areas of the PJM
association is expected to fall below
normal levels, and the association
expects that it cannot sell the pool's
excess power to the member
companies or other power pools.
Consequently, SER claimed that it
was not able to satisfy its own
requirements, resulting in its own
purchase of electricity and oil and
the incursion of extra costs and lost
revenues.
Based on the allegations of
curtailment, SER brought suit for
violation of the federal antitrust laws
under section 2 of the Sherman Act.
According to SER, PP & L violated
the Sherman Act when PP & L
monopolized and attempted to
monopolize the local market by
curtailing its energy purchases
which in turn harmed competition
and consumer welfare. Specifically,
SER contended that PP & L's
reduction in purchases of energy
from independent power producers
enables PP & L to maintain an
artificially high rate base and
deprives consumers of energy
sources other than those of PP & L.
Implicit in SER's allegations is the
notion that SER is a competitor of
PP & L. In addition, SER asserted
related state-law claims for breach
of contract, breach of good faith and
fair dealing, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation.
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Court Found No Viable
Antitrust Claim
The Third Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal of SER's
federal antitrust claims because the
terms of the contract and PURPA's
regulations prohibited SER from
competing with PP & L according to
the terms of their contract and
PURPA's regulations. Additionally,
the Third Circuit supported the
district court's refusal to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over
SER's state law claims.
In its analysis, the Third Circuit
first addressed SER's claim that PP
& L created artificially high rates
due to its reduction of purchases
from independent power producers.
The Third Circuit found that PP &
L's rate base is determined by
Pennsylvania regulators and not the
market. Therefore, SER's claim that
PP & L creates artificially high rates
was not within the purview of the
antitrust laws.
Furthermore, the Third Circuit
addressed SER's assertion that PP &
L's curtailment of energy purchases
deprived consumers of energy
sources. Concluding that energy
sources were products, not competitors, the Supreme Court noted that
SER's assertion did not constitute an
antitrust claim. The Supreme Court
stated that the issue was "whether
PP & L unlawfully excluded
independent power brokers like SER
from the relevant market, not
whether consumers receive electricity generated by nuclear, coal, culm,
solar or other sources for energy."
The Supreme Court stated that even
if it were to find that PP & L's
curtailment practices curbed or
destroyed competition, it would still

have to find a violation of the
antitrust laws. To do this, SER must
allege that PP & L in some way
acted to exclude SER as a competitor in the delivery of electricity to
customers in PP & L's service area."
Thus, SER would have to have
proven that it was PP & L's competitor.
The Supreme Court refused to
find SER a competitor of PP & L
because both PURPA's regulations
and their contract prohibited SER
from competing with PP & L.
Specifically, the Court accepted the
contention that the contract requires
SER "to sell [its electric energy]
exclusively to PP & L" for twenty
years. In addition, both state and
federal law prohibit SER from
competing with PP & L in the
wholesale market. Finally, the lack
of a transportation infrastructure
constitutes a "physical limitation"
that prevents SER from selling its
power directly to consumers in the
retail market. Because SER is
forbidden from being PP & L's
competitor, SER could not prove an
antitrust injury which is required for
any antitrust claim. The Supreme
Court noted that the antitrust laws
are intended to protect competition
for consumer welfare and that unless
a competitor or consumer can prove
injury which the antitrust laws are
designed to correct, there can be no
viable antitrust claim

Court Would Not Predict
the Future
SER claimed that it had a cause
of action under the Pennsylvania
Electricity Generation Customer
Choice and Competition Act, 66 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2801 (West
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1996). This Act restructures how
electricity is supplied within
Pennsylvania and will introduce
competitive retail access within PP
& L's service area. The Act's
provisions will be implemented over
time, preventing full direct access to
competition until the year 2001.
SER responded by stating that PP &
L's current curtailment of electric
energy purchases injures SER's
ability to compete with PP & L in
the future. The court refused to
predict the future for the sake of
finding an antitrust violation.
Specifically, the court stated that
"[w]e cannot permit SER to pursue
such a speculative path to recovery
under the Sherman Act."
This case demonstrates that the
antitrust laws are meticulously
technical in their application. Unless
a plaintiff can demonstrate that it is
a competitor and has suffered an
injury in which the antitrust laws are
designed to protect, it does not have
standing to bring an antitrust action.
The Third Circuit was admittedly
not clairvoyant nor willing to design
case law based upon the speculation
of "unsubstantiated conclusions and
bald assertions."

Concurring Judge Said SER
Had No Duty to Sell
Exclusively to PP & L
While agreeing with the majority
opinion that SER's antitrust claim
should be dismissed, the concurring
judge reached his decision with one
clarification. Judge Stapleton did not
accept the panel's conclusion that
SER had a duty to sell exclusively to
PP & L. Although the majority
opinion stated in a footnote that
SER, under the terms of the contract
only, may sell to third parties, the
majority declared that SER can sell
to third parties only after it "provides 79.5 megawatts to PP & L."
Judge Stapleton, on the other hand,
interpreted the contract to simply
require SER to have the capacity to
satisfy PP & L's requirements - up
to 79.5 megawatts if necessary - in
excess of SER's potential sales to
third parties.
Moreover, Judge Stapleton
addressed SER's claim that it is a
competitor in the retail market. He
stated that while the Pennsylvania
Electricity Generation Customer
Choice and Competition Act will

gradually initiate competition in the
retail market, there was no competition prior to its passage. He concluded that since the market was not
competitive, SER could not establish that it was PP & L's competitor,
a condition SER needed to satisfy to
prove an antitrust injury.
Finally, Judge Stapleton focused
on SER's assertion that it was a
competitor in the wholesale market.
He stated that while the terms of the
contract could be construed to mean
that SER's obligation to sell
exclusively to PP & L is limited to
its capacity to satisfy its contractual
obligations, SER did not allege that
it sold, attempted to sell, or intended
to sell any excess capacity. He
further noted that, even if SER were
allowed to amend its complaint, it
would be able to allege only that it
has the capacity to sell more than
79.5 megawatts, not that it has
competed with PP & L in the
wholesale market. Therefore, Judge
Stapleton agreed with the majority's
decision to affirm the district court's
dismissal of SER's antitrust claim.

National Magazine Sweepstakes Are Not Illegal
Lotteries Under California Law
by Rana Abbasi
In Haskell v. Time, Inc., 965 F.
Supp. 1398 (E.D. Cal. 1997), a
federal district court granted partial
summary judgment in favor of mailorder retailers who used sweepstakes offers in their magazine and
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book marketing campaigns, holding
that Defendants' national magazine
sweepstakes were legal lotteries, that
Defendants' promotional mailings
were not false advertising, and that
Defendants' did not run their
sweepstakes in a misleading manner.

However, the court refused to grant
summary judgment on the issue of
whether Plaintiff had proved that a
"prompt-pay" sweepstakes was an
illegal lottery because there was
insufficient evidence to decide the
issue.
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